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IH THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARCY G. MYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DARLENE STOUT (COPPLE), 
Defendant. 
Case No. 860279 - CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIBF 
The statement of jurisdiction and description of the 
nature of the proceedings in the lower court are as set forth 
in plaintiff-appellant's opening brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issues as hereafter stated are in answer to new matter 
set forth in defendant-respondent's brief: 
1. Whether rule 52(a) that findings of fact shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous has application here. 
2. Whether "an exception" to the merger rule applies 
avoid application of the rule. 
3. Whether an oral agreement for the sale and purchase 
of a one-half interest in the real property in question occurred. 
4. Whether "estoppel" did, or legally can, establish i 
defendant-respondent title to such one-half interest. 
5. Whether defendant-appellant's claim of "oral 
agreement" is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts as set forth in plaintiff-appellant's opening 
brief as well as in defendant-respondent's brief are restated 
here but to which is added that defendant-respondent neither 
pleaded (R 17-25, 180-184) nor does the record contain evidence 
that would tend to establish an exception to the "merger" rule. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The clearly erroneous rule has no application. 
The determination of the lower court that there was an oral 
agreement between Sandra Smith and defendant-respondent is a 
conclusion of law and is reviewed on the basis of "legal correct-
ness." Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah App. 1987); Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings 
& Loan Association, et al., 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1987! 
As pointed out in plaintiff-appellant's opening brief, there is 
no evidence of an oral agreement. 
2. All of the conditions for the application of the 
merger rule as stated in Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 198< 
are present here. Exceptions to the application of the rule 
exist, e.g., fraud, mistake, and the existence of collateral 
rights, Secor, supra, p. 793. But none of these exceptions were 
(2) 
pleaded by defendant-respondent and no evidence was offered 
with respect to any or either of such defenses. 
3. The terms of an oral contract for the sale and 
purchase of real property must be clear, definite, mutually1 
understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite 
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality. Christensen 
v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.id 101 (1959); Holmgren 
Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). In this 
case there is no evidence whatever to satisfy this rule; certainl 
acquiescence (revoked) may have been £hown but acquiescence too 
is a legal conclusion and tested for "legal correctness" on revie 
but even if found is insufficient in law to support the judgment 
where revoked. Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 
(1956). 
4. Defendant-appellant claims plaintiff-respondent 
is estopped. Our statute of frauds provides: 
Every contract for the . . . sale, 
of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall 
be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
Nothing in this chapter contained 
shall be construed to abridge the powers of 
courts to compel the specific performance 
of agreements in case of p^rt performance 
thereof. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel lias been extended in limited 
form to cases concerned with the statute of frauds where the 
(3) 
promise as to future conduct constitutes an intended abandonment 
of an existing right of the promisor. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 
2d 386, 295 P.2d 332. It has no application however, to create 
title but only operates to estopp one to assert the statute 
of frauds where he has, by his language or conduct, led another t 
do, upon the faith of an oral agreement, what he would not other-
wise have done, and changes his position to his prejudice. 73 Am 
Jur2d Statute of Frauds S567, pp. 205-206. Here, there is no 
oral agreement to serve as the basis for the claimed estoppel. 
5. Under the statute of frauds the courts are limited 
to compelling specific performance of partly performed agreements 
Defendant-respondent has pleaded her claimed "oral agreement11 wit 
Sandra Smith as a defense (R 180-184) but has requested no affiric 
tive relief by way of specific enforcement of the contract. The 
subject matter of the defense however, constitutes an independent 
cause of action as defined by the statute of frauds, was legally 
subsisting at the time of the commencement of this action by 
plaintiff-appellant's predecessor in title, and the statute of 
limitations is applicable thereto. 51 AmJur2d Limitations of 
Actions §78 p. 657. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in plaintiff-appellant's opening brief. 
ROYAL K. HUNT a % 
(4) 
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